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Browser fingerprinting is a surveillance technique
that uses browser and device attributes to track
visitors across the web. Defeating fingerprinting
requires blocking attribute information or spoofing
attributes, which can result in loss of functionality.
To address the challenge of escaping surveillance
while obtaining functionality, we identify six design
criteria for an ideal spoofing system. We present
three fingerprint generation algorithms as well as
a baseline algorithm that simply samples a dataset
of fingerprints. For each algorithm, we identify
trade-offs among the criteria: distinguishability from
a non-spoofed fingerprint, uniqueness, size of the
anonymity set, efficient generation, loss of web
functionality, and whether or not the algorithm protects
the confidentiality of the underlying dataset. We report
on a series of experiments illustrating that the use of our
Partially-Dependent algorithm for spoofing fingerprints
will avoid detection by machine learning approaches to
surveillance.
1. Introduction
In this work, we contribute three new algorithms for
spoofing fingerprints as well as an empirical analysis for
evaluation of their anonymity and efficiency as browser
fingerprinting countermeasures. We map this evaluation
to the motivations for fingerprinting spoofing taken
from previous research on usability and acceptability of
Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs). We illustrate
how different instantiations of these algorithms vary
in terms of how well they address user motivations
for avoiding fingerprinting. We specifically examine
the fingerprint generators in terms of the potential
deterioration of site functionality. Using the distribution
of results from the models and an existing dataset of
fingerprints, we evaluate the implementations in terms
of different threat models. We include a straightforward
sampling from the fingerprint dataset as a baseline in our
analysis. Specifically, our contributions are as follows:
Enumeration of the (sometimes implicit) requirements
and threat models from different fingerprint spoofing
approaches, and the design criteria resulting from those
threat models.
Design of three new algorithms that generate spoofed
fingerprints to address these criteria with four variations
for each algorithm.
Definition of general comparison metrics based on the
enumerated criteria.
Illustration of the usage of the introduced metrics
in evaluating the new algorithms, and their general
applicability by comparing our algorithms to a baseline
sampling approach.
Evaluating the strength of the new algorithms in the
context of multiple empirical experiments, specifically,
generating fingerprints and distinguishing a spoofed
fingerprint from genuine ones.
In addition to these contributions, we will also
make the code repository publicly available for ease of
reproducibility of our analysis.
2. Motivation
Web-based fingerprinting identifies the visitors by
leveraging the variability of machines, configuration
data, and browser parameters. Although there
are benign applications of these passive tracking
techniques [1], some web service providers use browser
fingerprinting for the purpose of user tracking [2]. An
analysis of the top million websites found fingerprinting
was extremely common with more than 80,000 entities
engaged in tracking [3].
The desire to avoid ubiquitous tracking and
information sharing is indicated by the widespread
adoption of ad-blocking and anti-tracking software [4].
This, in turn, has resulted in anti-ad-blocking activities
[5] including the detection of ad-blockers for denial of
access and changing domains to avoid ad-blocking rules
[4]. In addition to direct denials of service, protecting
against fingerprinting with some tools has a cost that





includes loss of specific desired functionality.
It would be reasonable to expect anti-fingerprinting
technology to have popularity similar to that of
ad-blocking, but that has not yet been observed. Perhaps
it is because current measures are not scalable and the
very tools distributed to mitigate fingerprinting may
create an additional threat by identifying an individual as
one seeking privacy, thus risking that they are subjected
to more targeted surveillance [6].
Previous research in usable security has found
that participants choose not to use privacy-enhancing
software in general because of the loss of functionality
[7]. Users may want the benefits of anti-fingerprinting
technologies, but the loss of functionality is too high a
cost for the corresponding privacy benefits. In that case,
preventing the functionality loss may broaden the use
of privacy-enhancing software [8, 9]. Finally, the work
by Juarez et al. [10] on identifying the vulnerability
of fingerprinting by local adversaries enumerates the
requirements for the availability of data for attackers.
3. Related Work
In the previous section, we identified primarily
motivating research. In this section, we focus on the
technical research that informs our approach to spoofing
algorithms.
Panopticlick project was the first impactful research
about browser fingerprinting [11, 12]. Panopticlick
illustrated the scope and potential of the threat of
fingerprinting. Following up on this, Nikiforakis et
al. [13] examined the code from three popular browser
fingerprinting code providers used for web-based device
fingerprinting and showed how browsers are vulnerable
to fingerprinting using novel browser identifying
techniques. Kaur et al. [14] analyzed the evolution of
browser fingerprinting and its effect on users’ privacy.
Al-Fannah and Li [15] performed an analysis on
the fingerprinting vulnerability of modern browsers.
They illustrated that browsers installed in default
modes provide very different levels of susceptibility to
fingerprinting and identified the features underlying this
difference. In the following year, Yan and Kaur [16]
implemented an exhaustive analysis of features that can
be used in the TCP/IP connection to fingerprint a user.
The sets of features identified in these analyses informed
our own feature selection.
Gómez-Boix et al. [17] analyzed the uniqueness
of fingerprints in their dataset of just over 2 million
fingerprints gathered from 15 French websites, arguing
that only 33.6% of the fingerprints are unique. Tanabe
et al. [18] studied the effect of attribute combination on
fingerprinting accuracy and found that the addition of
features could increase attacker accuracy.
4. Goal and Contributions
Our goal is to design a fingerprinting defense that
addresses some of the reasons users may have for
rejecting or not adopting anti-fingerprinting tools. To
build on previous research, our algorithms are designed
to address the factors that the PET community has
identified as underlying reasons for the lack of adoption
of PETs. Following the terminology in Table 1, we
detail our contributions as follows:
First, we clarify the problem statement by
systematizing the requirements of an ideal fingerprint
spoofing system and summarizing them as six
main characteristics: undetectability, guaranteed
non-uniqueness, increased k-anonymity, dataset
privacy, efficiency, and least burden.
Second, we define a spectrum on which fingerprint
spoofing models follow a trade-off between the
aforementioned characteristics. We then create three
probability models on that spectrum. On one end of
the spectrum, we offer the Independent model which is
detectable but efficient and respects the dataset privacy.
On the other end, we create the Fully-Dependent model,
which is undetectable and guarantees 2-anonymity (as
defined in Table 1) but is not efficient and does
not preserve the dataset privacy. The fingerprints
generated by Fully-Dependent model are also valid
and indistinguishable from the genuine fingerprints.
We do this since there are jurisdictions where using
PETs risks creating additional surveillance [19, 20], and
detection in such jurisdictions can also lead to blocking
of users or resources [21]. Additionally, we present
a third model in the middle of the spectrum, namely
Partially-Dependent, that is undetectable and preserves
the dataset privacy while being sufficiently efficient.
Third, we examine four variations for each
of these models, i.e., Greedy-Constrained,
Greedy-Unconstrained, Random-Constrained,
and Random-Unconstrained, that have different
applications. A Greedy model generates fingerprints
that are shared between multiple users. The approach of
maximizing crowd size by simply setting a single shared
fingerprint in a group of users to increase k-anonymity
is the approach used by Tor [22]. A Constrained
model sets an initial attribute to its correct values (e.g.,
language, location for maps, resolution for streaming)
and constructs a spoofed fingerprint around that. Ideally,
a model generating Constrained fingerprints reduces the
cost of using this obfuscating technology by minimizing
the disruption of services provided by the website. In the
case of the Greedy variation (i.e. Greedy-Constrained),
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Table 1: Definitions for the terminology used in this work
Term Definition
Fingerprint A combination of characteristics for a browser, used for identifying or tracking a user.
Paradoxical
Fingerprint
A fingerprint that could not technologically exist, e.g., a fingerprint of an iPhone that
claims a 36-inch screen.
Valid Fingerprint A fingerprint that is not paradoxical.
Genuine Fingerprint A valid fingerprint that is not tampered with or altered in any way.
Spoofed Fingerprint A fingerprint that has been altered by either a user or a program.
Attribute-Value Pair A key-value pair in which the key represents an attribute used in the fingerprint
spoofing system and the value represents a value taken by that attribute, e.g.,
{"video":"1920x1080x24"}.
Spoofing System A generative model that outputs fingerprints intended to obfuscate the user.
[Spoofing] Model A mathematical representation of the probability distributions over the space of
fingerprints.
Evaluator A computational model that estimates the occurrence probability of a given
fingerprint.
Generator A computational routine that generates a fingerprint based on a model.
Dataset-Sampler A generator that draws a uniform sample from a fingerprint dataset.
2-Anonymity A generator is said to guarantee 2-anonymity if any fingerprint it generates is used by
one or more other users, hence the anonymity set is an integer greater than 1 (i.e., 2).
users can also hide in the crowd by assigning the
same spoofed fingerprint. The model may also
generate a spoofed fingerprint using the already
set attributes by selecting random values for other
attributes (i.e., Random-Constrained). Alternatively,
the model can output a stochastic spoofed fingerprint
with no constraint (i.e., Random-Unconstrained) or
a fingerprint with the largest possible crowd size
(i.e, Greedy-Unconstrained) without consideration of
functionality.
Fourth, based on the characteristics we defined for an
ideal spoofing model, we propose comparison metrics
and illustrate their use in evaluating our models in
the context of the following experiments: generating
spoofed fingerprints, distinguishing a valid fingerprint
from a spoofed one in a pair, and detecting the spoofed
fingerprints in a set of fingerprints.
An overall goal of our design and implementation
is to move the frontier on the trade-off between privacy
and functionality in fingerprint spoofing.
5. Problem Statement
In response to the prevalence of browser
fingerprinting (Section 2) and using the definitions given
in Table 1, we define a fingerprint modeling system
called FPModeler as a generative model with optional
evaluation elements. When generating, FPModeler can
operate in two modes: 1) Unconstrained, in which the
system generates a random but valid fingerprint, and 2)
Constrained, where given an input in the form of an
attribute and corresponding value as a constraint, the
system outputs a fingerprint that is random, technically
valid, and with selected attribute(s) set as desired. Next,
we detail the evaluation metrics for FPModeler.
5.1. Design Criteria and Evaluation Metrics
Building on the motivation presented in Section 2,
in this section we define the criteria we used to evaluate
variations of FPModeler.
Previous research on browsing illustrated that a
badly designed obfuscating algorithm, which generated
invalid data actually caused the machine to be
highly identifiable, decreasing rather than increasing
anonymity as the attributes were never similar to the
genuine records in the dataset and always technically
invalid [23, 24]. The result is a requirement
for FPModeler to generate spoofed fingerprints that
are individually indistinguishable from a genuine
fingerprint. The ability of FPModeler to meet this
requirement contributes to multiple criteria: The first
is ensuring that the distribution of the generated
fingerprints is similar to that of the genuine fingerprints
so that the use of FPModeler is undetectable. Second,
generated spoofed fingerprints should not be unique,
i.e., Non-Uniqueness. The third criterion extends this,
where we evaluate the size of the expected anonymity
set, i.e. K-anonymity.
There is a potential positive secondary effect
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on everyone’s privacy that results from spoofed
fingerprints being indistinguishable from genuine
samples. In general, anonymity loves company [6].
In this specific case, consider a tracking service
that continuously improves by observing browser
fingerprints. The possibility of filtering out the spoofed
fingerprints increases the accuracy of such a tracking
system, making it more privacy-invasive. Conversely,
contaminating the system’s observed fingerprints with
indistinguishable spoofed fingerprints could reduce the
accuracy of such a tracking system [25].
A spoofing system should also be efficient, meaning
that runtime requirements for processing power and
delay are minimal. FPModeler should be sufficiently
efficient to allow frequent generation of distinct
unlinkable spoofed fingerprints.
A system should also require the user to accept the
least burden possible. That is, when there is a core
functionality of a website, the spoofed fingerprint should
not interfere with that functionality.
For a single user to remain obfuscated, we require
information about distributions of attributes, and that
requires a large dataset of fingerprints. Such a dataset
perversely generates its own inherent privacy concerns
[26, 23]. The dataset itself should be protected
to ensure the privacy of the users whose data it
contains. The differences between the fingerprints
in the underlying dataset and that of the visitors of
the tracking websites enable the trackers to identify
the users of FPModeler. Such identification would
subvert FPModeler user anonymity by undermining
indistinguishability. Therefore, another goal is to ensure
Dataset Privacy.
In summary, the criteria for evaluation of FPModeler
are as follows:
1. Indistinguishability:
Undetectability: determines the similarity between
the distribution of FPModeler’s generated
fingerprints and the distribution of genuine
fingerprints.
Guaranteed Non-Uniqueness: makes sure that a
spoofed fingerprint is not unique and is taken by at
least another user of the system.
k-anonymity: is a stronger requirement than
non-uniqueness when k > 2; it requires that each
generated fingerprint is part of an anonymity set
with a cardinality of at least k. Higher values of
k allow the users to hide in a larger crowd. This
is the approach taken by the Tor browser where the
k-anonymity set is all Tor users.
2. Efficiency: specifies the efficiency of the FPModeler
regarding runtime and space (memory) usage.
3. Least burden: identifies if the FPModeler settings
disrupts the functionality of the website.
4. Dataset Privacy: indicates how well the FPModeler
is concealing information about the dataset.
We compare our models according to these criteria and
present our comparison in Section 6.2.
6. Methods
We present three models and a data sampler (used
as a baseline), so that we cover the spectrum of models
defined between the following two distinct approaches:
Oblivious: in which FPModeler chooses a value for
each attribute without any prior information about the
joint distribution of attribute-values. Lossless: in which
the fingerprints generated by FPModeler are uniform
samples from a pre-constructed dataset.
In the oblivious approach, the spoofing system is
highly efficient and protects dataset privacy. The
shortcoming of this approach is that the generated
fingerprints can be paradoxical and, thus, easily
detectable. A lossless approach guarantees the
undetectability of the generated fingerprints (assuming
that the given dataset accurately represents the
distribution of genuine fingerprints). Yet, it is neither
efficient nor does it preserve the dataset privacy.
We examine how these approaches offer trade-offs
between desirable features. It is possible to define other
models and variations but in this paper, we focus on
those that are most representative of this spectrum. In
the next section, we include three probability models on
the spectrum.
6.1. Probability Models
Here we specify multiple probability models located
on the spectrum between oblivious and lossless.
Notation. Let F denote a typical fingerprint with n
attributes a1, . . . , an. Each attribute ai can take values
from a finite set Ai. Based on this notation, we write
P (F ) to denote the probability (likelihood) for the
fingerprint attributes of an genuine browser taking the





P (a1 = v1, a2 = v2, ..., an = vn) = 1
In the following, we present multiple models
that provide an estimation for P (a1 = v1, a2 =
v2, ..., an = vn) based on some assumptions and
pre-tuned parameters.
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Independent This model provides a probability for a
fingerprint based on an assumption that the distribution
of values for each attribute is independent of other
attributes. This assumption simplifies the calculations
and results in a low number of parameters. Hence, we
have,
P (F ) = P (a1 = v1, a2 = v2, ..., an = vn)
= P (a1 = v1)× P (a2 = v2)× · · · × P (an = vn)
(1)
Notice that this model has Πni=1|Ai| parameters.
Each parameter represents the probability of one
attribute-value. One can infer these parameters by
processing a given dataset of fingerprints.
Partially-Dependent This model takes the
dependence between the pairs of attribute-values
into account. In this case, P (a1 = v1|a2 = v2) denotes
the conditional probability of attribute a1 taking the
value v1 given that a2 has taken the value v2. For this
model we make the simplifying assumption that this
dependence is only for one level, i.e., conditioned on
the event a1 = v1, the events a2 = v2 and a3 = v3
are independent. (For example, screen size depends
on the device, while operating system and location are
independent.) Based on this assumption we have
P (F ) = P (a1 = v1 | a2 = v2, . . . , an = vn)
= P (a1 = v1)× P (a2 = v2 | a1 = v1)
× P (a3 = v3 | a2 = v2)× . . .
× P (an = vn | an−1 = vn−1)
(2)
Notice that this model contains the parameters
corresponding to the attribute-value pairs, e.g., P (ai =
vi|aj = vj),∀ 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n, as well as the parameters
in Independent. One can represent these parameters
as a weighted directed graph with attribute-values as
nodes and the conditional probabilities as the weights
of edges. The weights of nodes also correspond to the
P (ai = vi),∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
When FPModeler assumes limited independence,
the result of the calculation does not depend on the order
in which the conditional probabilities are multiplied in
Equation 2. When this condition is not satisfied, the
estimation of P (F ) depends on the order of attributes.
To achieve a consistent and well-defined estimation
function, we choose an arbitrary (but fixed) order and
follow it whenever this model is used.
Fully-Dependent This model preserves dependence
information between attribute-values and store all
non-zero probabilities of fingerprints. Here, we describe
a tree data structure realizing the requirement. Fix an
arbitrary order on the attributes, say a1, a2, . . . , an. We
label the nodes at ith level with a tuple of attribute-values
for the first i attributes. Also, we store the number of
fingerprints matching the first i attributes to the tuple
indicated as the label. Each node in the ith level have, at
most, |Ai+1| children in i + 1st level, iterating over all
possible values for attribute ai+1. This data structure
makes it easy to answer the conditional probability
queries like P (ai = vi|a1 = v1, a2 = v2, . . . , ai−1 =
vi−1) as well as full fingerprint probability queries like
P (a1 = v1, a2 = v2, . . . , an = vn).
One of the applications of the models presented
in this section is the evaluation of the validity of
fingerprints. The equations defined for each model
to calculate the fingerprint probability P (F ) are used
as a measure for distinguishing valid and paradoxical
fingerprints. This can be achieved by defining a
threshold with fingerprints having a probability below
that threshold being considered invalid, and at or above
it as valid.
6.2. Using the Models in the Generation Tasks
We implemented the models to generate fingerprints
with the variations described below. The accuracy
and efficiency of the main generative approaches are
detailed in Section 8. On the offensive side, after using
FPModeler to detect that the value of an attribute has
been spoofed, the service provider has multiple options.
These options include (i) denial of service to the user
(as responses to ad-blockers and Tor illustrate); (ii)
attempting to track by matching the partial fingerprint to
a previous fingerprint of the user; or (iii) removing the
value of the suspicious attribute to impute a new value
and then use the updated fingerprint for tracking.
6.3. Variations
For each model, we have considered the following
boolean characteristics:
Random or Greedy: A Random generator model selects
any non-zero probability so that a large set of
fingerprints will have the same distribution of attributes
as a large set of fingerprints in the wild. The benefit
of this is that the set as a whole is indistinguishable
from genuine fingerprints. The disadvantage is that
there is a risk of small anonymity sets. A Greedy
generator model always selects the most likely attribute.
The benefit of this is that there will be the largest
anonymity set. The disadvantage is that, over time or
based on the underlying data, the generated fingerprints
will reach a predictable equilibrium so that any entity
using the specific Greedy result could be identified with




















Expected Anonymity Set (k-anonymity)
Efficiency
Least Burden (Better Functionality)
Preserves Dataset Privacy
Very Low Low Medium High Very High
Figure 1: The differences in the metrics across all
four possible modes of operation of each of the models
presented in this paper.
Dataset-Sampler (as defined in Table 1) cannot have a
Greedy variation since it is not a probability model.
Constrained or Unconstrained: A Constrained
fingerprint will always have a particular value for
an attribute. This is useful when an attribute is
inextricably linked with the functionality of a website,
e.g., time zone for a calendar website. On the other
hand, an Unconstrained generator just randomly
generates a fingerprint without focusing on any of the
attributes.
Thus, for each of our three models, there are
four variation of generators: Greedy-Constrained,
Greedy-Unconstrained, Random-Constrained, and
Random-Unconstrained. Additionally, we have
Random-Constrained and Random-Unconstrained
variations of Dataset-Sampler, summing up to 14
generators in total: 12 generative models plus 2
generators based on Dataset-Sampler.
There are differences both among the models and
across the variations of each model, as summarized
in Fig. 1. All variations of the Fully-Dependent
model and Dataset-Sampler guarantee non-uniqueness
because their generated fingerprints are in the dataset
and, hence, previously used at least once. Among the
variations of the Independent and Partially-Dependent
models, only the Greedy-Unconstrained guarantees
non-uniqueness. This is because the constraint in the
Greedy-Constrained variation may be unique to the
user. The random variations of each model do not offer
guarantees of non-uniqueness.
7. Dataset
We used a large dataset of browser fingerprints
created by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF).
We particularly focused on a subset of attributes
because they are easy to capture. However, our
mathematical models are independent of these features:
cookie enabled indicating whether a cookie is
enabled in the browser; user agent, which is the
User-Agent request header; http accept, which
contains a list of content types that the browser
can accept; timezone indicates the timezone of
the browser; video provides information about
screen resolution of the browser; super cookies,
which contains information about the super cookies;
dnt enabled that indicates whether or not Do
Not Track flag is set; language, which shows
the supported languages of the browser; platform
indicating the operating system of on which the
browser is running; and finally touch support,
which contains information about whether or not the
device has a touch screen. Two of these attributes,
i.e., user agent and http accept, are given as
raw strings that hold discrete pieces of information.
For example, user agent may have the browser
version and OS version embedded in its value.
Therefore, we parse the string values and extract
some sub-attributes as follows: browser family,
browser version, os family, os version,
and device family from user agent (similarly,
mime type and q factor from http accept).
Any recorded dataset of fingerprints is expected to
contain some spoofed fingerprints. For our purposes,
we need to filter spoofed entries and keep the authentic
fingerprints. Our results in Section 8 assume genuine,
or at least representative, fingerprints. One of the
challenges here is the fact that the unique valid
fingerprints (perhaps without even a similar fingerprint)
in the dataset which may conventionally be considered
as outliers should not be filtered. An ideal approach
filters out those spoofed fingerprints that are likely
paradoxical.
Our first step was to filter out obviously spoofed
fingerprints. For example, we deleted all fingerprints
corresponding to the Tor browser [22].
For the second step, we used two well-known
Machine Learning pipelines based on DBSCAN
clustering (the first one with t-SNE dimension
reduction and the second one without). These
methods use a distance measure between all pairs
of fingerprints in the dataset. We considered two
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approaches for implementing the distance function.
First, we implemented a high-accuracy, fine-grained,
computationally expensive distance function which
calculates the distance of each attribute separately based
on the characteristics of that attribute. Second, we
used a simpler approach based on string edit distance
algorithms (Levenshtein distance). Edit distance is a
method of quantifying the dissimilarity between two
strings based on the minimum number of operations
needed to transform one into another [27]. The distance
between two fingerprints is calculated as the square
root of the sum of the normalized Levenshtein distance
between each attribute. Distances for an attribute
pair were normalized using the maximum distance for
that attribute across all evaluated fingerprints. After
preparing the distance matrix for the dataset, we used
DBSCAN to detect the outliers in the dataset in two
ways: (i) DBSCAN was applied directly on the distance
matrix (ii) two t-SNE features were extracted given the
distance matrix and then DBSCAN was applied to the
fingerprints on the embedded space. Outliers identified
using either the fine-grain and dimension-reduced
measures of distance were excluded from our models.
The identified outliers were few in number (< 10).
8. Results
In the following, we detail the experiments used to
evaluate the models and describe the results. These
experiments help us assess the strength of suggested
generators against the threat of identification of a
fingerprint as spoofed or exposure of information from
the underlying database.
To perform the experiments in this section, we
created two non-intersecting subsets of fingerprints by
dividing our dataset into two parts, each comprised
of 1 million fingerprints. We refer to these datasets
as training and test datasets accordingly. We
performed part of our analysis using Receiver Operating
Characteristic (ROC) curves. As a gentle reminder, the
X and Y axes of the ROC curve correspond to true
positive rate (i.e., trust positives divided by all positives)
and false-positive rate (i.e., false positives divided by all
positives).
Distinguishing Valid Fingerprint from Spoofed
Ones: To compare the performance of the evaluators,
we initially selected a sample set of 10k fingerprint pairs
(20k in total)1 where each pair has one valid fingerprint
randomly picked from the dataset as well as one spoofed
1Given the quadratic runtime of the approach described in this
section, utilizing the whole dataset was not feasible. However, the
qualitative comparisons resulting from the experiments are expected
to hold regardless of the dataset size.
fingerprint generated by the Independent model. The
evaluation of a model on a pair is defined as a “success”
if the model assigned a higher probability to the valid
fingerprint. We report the accuracy as the number of
successes over the entire sample size.
This experiment is done in two scenarios: 1) the
training dataset is used in both training the evaluators
and constructing the sample pairs; 2) the evaluators are
trained on the training dataset, then the test dataset is
used for constructing the sample pairs. Our results, as
shown in Table 2, confirm that the accuracy of all models
is higher in the first scenario compared to the second
scenario. This is expected because the valid fingerprints
have been shown to the models beforehand. The
figure also shows that the Independent model has poor
performance with a low accuracy of 56-57% in both
scenarios. We also confirm that the Fully-Dependent
model has the highest precision (of 99.6%) when the
training set is used, i.e., this model is most effective for
training. However, its precision drops to 77% when the
test dataset is used. This observation reflects that the
Fully-Dependent model stores details that are specific to
the training dataset but are not effective in distinguishing
valid from invalid information with a larger dataset;
This phenomenon is referred to as overfitting in machine
learning. On the other hand, Partially-Dependent has
slightly worse but still good performance on the training
dataset, with a much smaller decrease in accuracy (<
2%) when encountering the test dataset.
Classification of Fingerprints: We use the same
sample set from the previous experiment here. Recall
that the sample set contains 20k fingerprints divided
evenly between genuine and spoofed fingerprints. Each
model assigns a probability for each fingerprint in the
sample set. Using this distribution we set a threshold
to classify the fingerprints as genuine or spoofed. We
compare the results with the ground truth and count
how many fingerprints from each class are classified
correctly. We compare the results across different
models using ROC curves. Here, “True Positive”
denotes the number of genuine fingerprints detected as
Table 2: Accuracy of each evaluator for distinguishing
valid fingerprints from the spoofed ones among 10k






Test 56% 94% 77%
Training 57% 96% 99%
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Figure 2: ROC curves for the performance of each model in classifying a sample set of 20k fingerprints of genuine
vs. spoofed fingerprints. Panel (a) and (b) samples are drawn from the test datasets and the training, respectively. The
points in this plot correspond to different levels of the probability threshold for the output of each model.
genuine (or detected as spoofed for “False Negative”)
by the model, and “True Negative” refers to the number
of spoofed fingerprints generated using the Independent
model detected as spoofed fingerprints (or detected as
genuine for “False Positive”) by the model. The results
are presented in Fig. 2. Again we ran the experiment
twice, once reusing the test data (panel a) and once with
the discrete training data (panel b).
The results confirm the findings from the previous
experiment. Specifically, the Independent model
performance is poor and closer to the random
guessing. The Fully-Dependent model suffers from
over-fitting as it performs flawlessly on the training
dataset but drops precipitously on the test dataset.
The Partially-Dependent model’s performance is
remarkably consistent on both datasets which makes it
a better fit for use in practice.
Probability Distributions In the last experiment in
this section, we present more detailed information about
the performance of the evaluation models. In this
experiment, each of the three previously described
generator models was used to generate 10k fingerprints.
In addition, the Dataset-Sampler was used to sample
10k fingerprints directly from the test dataset, resulting
in a total of four batches of fingerprints. Then the
evaluation models were used to calculate the probability
distribution for each of these fingerprint batches. The
histogram of these fingerprints is presented in Fig.
3. This histogram shows the negative log of the
probabilities, meaning that the probability is higher
when the values are closer to zero. Thus a flatter curve
suggests more instances of low-probability fingerprints,
which therefore indicates that the evaluation model
is detecting an increasing number of paradoxical
fingerprints from the generator model.
Note the Partially-Dependent model in the second
column of Fig. 3. We can see that the model
can more reliably distinguish the fingerprints generated
by the Independent generator model when compared
with the valid fingerprints of Dataset-Sampler as the
former has flatter curve. Again the Independent
model has a poor evaluation performance since the
probabilities that it calculates for valid fingerprints are
generally lower than the probabilities of fingerprints
generated with the Independent generator model.
Although the Fully-Dependent model presents a flatter
histogram for the Independent generator compared
to the valid fingerprints of Dataset-Sampler, its
evaluation of Dataset-Sampler is inferior relative to the
Partially-Dependent evaluation model.
Comparing Runtime & Memory Costs Recall that
one of the criteria for evaluation is performance.
We compared the runtime of the models relative to
both model creation (training) and generating new
fingerprints. The training time of all three models is
asymptotically linear relative to the input size.
The results of our performance evaluation in terms of
system requirements were that the highest performing
model Partially-Dependent required ∼12MB to be
stored on disk when trained on ∼1M fingerprints.
Fully-Dependent models were ∼15x larger in size.
Generation of fingerprints using any of the three
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Figure 3: Distribution for the likelihood of fingerprints calculated by different models over 10k sample fingerprints
generated by each model (the probability is higher when the values are closer to zero). The Generative models are
built from the training dataset, and the evaluation models are built from the test dataset.
models has asymptotic runtime linear in terms of the
number of attributes and thus is not expected to be an
issue for users. Since the runtime of generating a single
fingerprint is short and can be sensitive to unrelated
factors, we measured the runtime of generating 1 million
fingerprints for each model. We concluded that the
runtimes of the models are very close despite their
significant differences in space usages.
9. Conclusions
We constructed three algorithms for creating spoofed
fingerprints and evaluated them according to criteria
developed from previous research on why people use
(or don’t use) PETs. Each of these three approaches
captures different levels of dependencies between
attributes. All pairs of attributes are independent in
the first model, only pairwise dependence is considered
in the second model, and the full chain of possible
dependencies is considered in the third model.
Based on that criteria we sought to efficiently
provide anonymized fingerprints while maintaining the
functionality of websites and remaining undetected by
trackers. To do so we built a fingerprint model generator
and evaluator called FPModeler and used a dataset of
more than 2 million fingerprints as a starting point
to generate our models. Maintaining the statistical
privacy of the entries in this dataset was an additional
requirement, based on protecting the privacy of the
people who contributed fingerprints to the dataset.
We identified the trade-offs of different models in
terms of the relationships between indistinguishability
(i.e., detectability, guaranteed non-uniqueness,
and k-anonymity), as well as efficiency, website
functionality while spoofing, and the privacy of
the participants whose data underlie the creation of
FPModeler. We provided the detail necessary to repeat
our evaluations for generating fingerprints, and repeated
detection of a genuine fingerprint in pairs of sampled
and generated entries.
Our results illustrate that it is feasible to use
the Partially-Dependent model to provide undetectable
and efficient fingerprint spoofing with high levels of
anonymity; not only for the users leveraging the prior
likelihoods to spoof convincingly but also for the
participants who have contributed fingerprints to the
dataset. In future work, we hope to evaluate the usability
and acceptability of our models in browsers.
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